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Structure preservation in comparatives*
Alexis Wellwood
University of Southern California
Abstract Comparatives can invoke various dimensions for comparison, but not any-
thing goes: more coffee invokes volume or weight, but not temperature, while more
coffees invokes number, but not volume or weight. In general, the extant literature
assumes that the difference between more coffee/coffees reflects a morphosyntactic
ambiguity of more, such that it spells out MUCH-ER with bare nouns, and MANY-ER
with plural nouns. Semantically, MUCH introduces a variable over measure func-
tions, with constraints, whereas MANY introduces a cardinality function. I argue for
an alternative, univocal theory based on the decomposition MUCH-ER, and account
for the observed patterns of constrained variability by means of a stronger condition
on the selection of measure functions than has previously been proposed.
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1 Introduction
In a degree semantics framework,1 it is uncontroversial to assume that part of the
meaning of more as it occurs in nominal comparatives like (1) introduces a measure
function, whereas this role is played by the gradable adjective hot in adjectival
comparatives like (2). This paper is concerned with the identity and meaning of the
part of more that does this.
(1) a. Ann bought more coffee than Bill did.
b. Ann bought more coffees than Bill did.
(2) a. Ann’s coffee is hotter than Bill’s is.
b. Ann bought hotter coffees than Bill did.
* I would like to thank Jeremy Goodman, Michael Glanzberg, Barry Schein, Una Stojnic´, and Paolo
Santorio for helpful recent discussion.
1 I do not motivate this framework here (for early works see Seuren 1973, 1984; Cresswell 1976),
and I assume the variant usually attributed to Kennedy 1999 in which, e.g., tall denotes a ‘measure
function’ of type 〈e,d〉. Since any possible scopal interactions with the -er morpheme will not be at
issue, I won’t appeal to the higher-typed variant usually attributed to Heim 1985, 2001 in which tall
denotes a ‘degree relation’ of type 〈d,〈e, t〉〉, itself embedding a measure function.
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I focus this investigation on two generalizations. The first, Monotonicity, captures
the fact that while the dimension for comparison with more can vary within predicates
P, as well as across predicates—e.g., (1a) can express a comparison by volume
or weight, while (1b) expresses a comparison by number—the only permissible
dimensions are ones that preserve strict ordering relations on the measured domain
DP—e.g., (1a) cannot be understood as a comparison by temperature, since this
might involve mapping a portion of coffee and its subparts to the same degree.
Monotonicity Schwarzschild 2002, 2006
Comparatives show variable dimensionality, but permissible dimen-
sions for more P preserve strict ordering relations on DP.
The second generalization, Number, captures the fact that the only permissible
dimension for comparison when more occurs with plural nouns is number, or car-
dinality.2 This is true for (1b) with coffees, despite the availability of the volume
and weight dimensions when its head noun coffee occurs without the plural mor-
pheme. It is also true for nouns like ideas, where the corresponding bare form makes
no dimensions available, or at least not easily (cp. ?more idea and more ideas).
Importantly, the restriction to number with more P-s also adheres to Monotonicity.
Number Hackl 2001; Bale & Barner 2009
Plural N comparatives permit only number-based comparisons.
The literature on nominal comparatives tends to assume that these patterns arise
due to an ambiguity of more. In brief, an Ambiguity account (found in various
forms in Bresnan 1973; Cresswell 1976; von Stechow 1984; Heim 1985; Rett 2008;
Hackl 2001; Bhatt & Pancheva 2004; Solt 2015, among others) holds that more is
homophonous between the morphosyntactic complexes MUCH-ER and MANY-ER
which selectively occur with bare and plural nouns, respectively. On such a view,
the semantics of MUCH will be freer than MANY in terms of dimensionality, but that
semantics will be constrained so as to capture the Monotonicity generalization.
I argue for a different, univocal account, building on Schwarzschild’s (2002;
2006) theory of dimensional restrictions for sentences like (1a). My goal in extending
that theory is to ensure that sentences like (1b) are restricted to comparison by
cardinality. In other words, where Schwarzschild’s theory permits cardinality for
more coffees, I aim to enforce it. On such a Univocality account, the Number
generalization is viewed as a subcase of Monotonicity, and to capture it, we need
2 There is a well-known class of apparent counter-examples, the so-called ‘mass plurals’. See, among
others, Acquaviva 2008; Schwarzschild 2012; Solt 2015; and Wellwood 2014.
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account string morphosyntax semantics
Ambiguity more N MUCHµ -ER N . . .σ(µ)(x) . . .
more Ns MANY-ER N-PL . . .cardinality(xx) . . .
Univocality more N MUCHµ -ER N . . .σ(µ)(x) . . .
more Ns MUCHµ -ER N-PL . . .σ(µ)(xx) . . .
Table 1 Aligning strings, structures, and semantics on the two accounts.
only augment Schwarzschild’s condition on the selection of measure functions with
an additional condition that further restricts that selection.
The two accounts can be assumed to overlap in how they analyze MUCH, such that
it carries an index µ of the measure function type. The value of this variable in (i.e.,
σ(µ), for an assignment σ ) in sentences like (1a) is constrained by Schwarzschild’s
condition. The accounts part ways for sentences like (1b). Where the Univocality
account further constrains the selection of σ(µ), the Ambiguity account posits a
distinct lexical primitive, MANY, to itself introduce a specific measure function. The
similarities and differences between these accounts are summarized in Table 1.3
Before turning to my argument, it is important to note that the range of data that
these accounts apply to extends beyond comparative constructions with more, and
beyond nominal comparatives to include (at least) verbal comparatives.4 That is, both
Monotonicity and Number appear to capture relevant facts about the interpretation
of sentences in which the expression introducing the comparative relation is as,
too, enough, etc.; see (3) for examples. The same can be observed for verbal
comparatives; see (4).
(3) Nominal; Monotonicity and Number
a. as much coffee volume, weight, *temperature
b. too many coffees cardinality, *volume, *weight
(4) Verbal; Monotonicity and Number
a. run on the track as much distance, duration, *speed
b. run to the track more/as many times cardinality, *dist., *dur.
In what follows, I argue that the Univocality account provides a better explanation
for Monotonicity and Number, as well as satellite facts. The last two sections of
3 By xx, yy, &c. in Table 1 and below, I intend only visual clarity of talk of pluralities—the nature and
formal representation of plurality won’t be at issue here. See Liebesman 2016, though, for recent
discussion and citations of this notation, drawn from plural logic.
4 Dunbar & Wellwood 2016 and Cariani, Santorio & Wellwood 2018; submitted further suggest
extensions to adjectival comparatives. See also Fults 2006.
80
Structure preservation
the paper discuss further considerations that might recommend it: (i) a univocal
theory supports a uniform, compositional theory of degree introduction (Wellwood
2012, 2014, 2015, forthcoming); (ii) it implies an explicitly measurement-theoretic
functional vocabulary (cp. Sassoon 2010; cf. Krantz, Luce, Suppes & Tversky 1971;
Berka 1983; Roberts 1985); and (iii) it unifies otherwise disparate experimental
results with children and adults (e.g., Gathercole 1985; Halberda & Feigenson 2008;
Odic, Pietroski, Hunter, Lidz & Halberda 2013).
2 Ambiguity + S-monotonicity
The form of Ambiguity account that I consider interprets MUCH as a variable
valued by measure functions. A constraint on the assignment of values to this
variable captures the Monotonicity generalization directly (‘S-monotonicity’, af-
ter Schwarzschild 2002, 2006; see also Nakanishi 2007; Wellwood, Hacquard &
Pancheva 2012, and others). Additionally, MANY is interpreted as a cardinality
function, which gets the Number generalization directly. I briefly sketch such an
account, and then present some reasons to seek an alternative.
2.1 Morphosyntax
Characteristic of approaches to nominal comparatives since at least Bresnan 1973
that consider their occurrences with bare and plural nouns like (1) is the assumption
that the form more is homophonous between two distinct morphosyntactic structures.
In the context of a bare noun, more corresponds to the complex MUCH-ER, (5a), and
in the context of a plural noun, it corresponds to MANY-ER, (5b).
(5) Ambiguity account: Morphosyntactic decomposition
a. more1 coffee! MUCH-ER COFFEE
b. more2 coffees! MANY-ER COFFEE-PL
Bresnan pointed out that more appears to belong to a semantically coherent
category of functional items that usually overtly cue morphosyntactic complexity; for
example, more coffee and as much coffee, which involve ‘strictly greater than’ and ‘at
least as great’ relations between amounts of coffee, respectively (cf. Schwarzschild
2008). Given Bresnan’s analysis, the compositional semantics can follow directly:
both more and as much share the piece MUCH, which introduces ‘amounts’ or
‘degrees’ in relation to the coffee, in the present examples; and, they differ in the
pieces -ER and AS, which introduce the relevant relations between degrees.
By the same reasoning, it is tempting to offer a distinct decompositional analysis
of more when it occurs with plural nouns. Surveying a broader range of forms, it
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quickly becomes apparent that English includes a grammatical difference between
the surface forms much and many, (6-7).
(6) Only much with bare nouns
a. as/too/so much coffee
b. * as/too/so many coffee
(7) Only many with plural nouns
a. * as/too/so much coffees
b. as/too/so many coffees
Moreover, there is an important semantic difference that attends the occurrences
of these forms. Whenever many occurs overtly, the Number generalization holds.
We would thus be missing a generalization if we simply talked in broad terms about
comparisons between ‘amounts’, as we do with much, or as we would appear to do
if we uniquely decomposed more in such terms. Thus, it has seemed reasonable both
for distributional and semantic reasons to posit something like (5).
2.2 Semantics
An Ambiguity account of this sort must give two semantic analyses: one for more1,
the surface realization of MUCH-ER, and one for more2, i.e. MANY-ER.5
The basic observation about comparatives with bare nouns (those featuring
more1) is that they display variable dimensionality, both across and within predicates.
The examples in (8) together illustrate both sorts of variability: combining more1
with coffee allows for comparisons by volume or weight, as in (8a); and, on the
assumption that non-cardinal dimensions signal the presence of more1 as opposed
to that of more2, combining that expression with run allows for comparisons by
distance or duration, as in (8b).
(8) Variability within predicates
a. more1 coffee volume, weight
b. run more1 distance, duration
Yet, it is not the case that more1 is unconstrained. While its combination with
coffee supports comparisons along a plurality of dimensions (e.g., (8a)), more1
coffee cannot be understood as a comparison along many of the dimensions we
5 A complete treatment would also link the interpretations assigned to the pieces MUCH and MANY
to their meaning contribution outside of the comparative forms; see e.g. Rett 2008; Solt 2015; and
Wellwood 2014 for recent discussion.
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might otherwise care to compare coffee along, e.g. temperature, tastiness, strength,
etc.; (9a). Whatever accounts for this pattern of restricted variability, it cannot simply
be that more1 is unable to introduce such measures, since examples where it does can
easily be constructed. For one, more1 global warming is most naturally interpreted
as a comparison by temperature, (9b).
(9) Variability across predicates
a. more1 coffee volume, *temperature
b. more1 global warming temperature, *volume
Finally, the basic observation about comparatives with plural nouns (those, or so
we are supposing, that feature more2) is that they appear to only involve comparisons
by cardinality.6 This is true both for cases where the head noun that has been
pluralized would otherwise permit dimensions other than cardinality, (10), as well
as for cases where the head noun fails to permit other dimensions for comparison,
(11), or at least not as easily.
(10) Excludes dimensions available to N
a. more1 coffee volume, *cardinality
b. more2 coffees cardinality, *volume
(11) Introduces dimension unavailable to N
a. more traffic cone ??
b. more2 traffic cones cardinality
The sort of Ambiguity approach that I have sketched can straightforwardly
account for these patterns. It need only interpret the piece MUCH, realized in part by
more1, as expressing a contextually-provided measure function; this is represented
in (12a), where σ is any assignment function, and σ(µ) is the measure function
that σ assigns to µ . In contrast, the piece MANY, realized in part by more2, can be
interpreted as a cardinality function—that is, any function that maps pluralities (xx,
yy, etc.) to the number of their individual parts, (12b).
(12) Ambiguity account: semantics of more1 and more2, respectively
a. JMUCHµ -ERKσ (d)(x) = σ(µ)(x)> d
b. JMANY-ERKσ (d)(xx) = cardinality(xx)> d
6 For notes regarding a prominent potential class of counterexamples, see footnote 2.
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This account therefore captures the Number generalization directly: we only
observe the cardinal dimension with plural nouns because only MANY occurs with
plurals. A little more needs to be said in order to capture the Monotonicity general-
ization. Building on Schwarzschild 2002, 2006, we get this by adding the condition
that permissible values of µ given σ must be S(chwarzschild)-monotonic.7,8
S-monotonicity Schwarzschild 2002, 2006
∀x,y ∈ DP, if x≺P y, then µ(x)< µ(y).
In other words, permissible σ(µ) applied to some x must be such that any strict
ordering relations holding between x and any y in that same domain are preserved in
the mapping to degrees.
To see what work this does, suppose along with many semanticists that the
extension of coffee is a mereologically-ordered set of portions of coffee.9 More
formally, assume a context in which JcoffeeK = {. . . ,c,c′,c⊕ c′, . . .} = DC, a set
closed under sum, ⊕. There is a partial ordering on this set, 4C, and, intuitively, for
any x,y ∈ DC such that x≺C y, (13) hold. Given that temperature generally fails to
preserve non-trivial part-whole relations, S-monotonicity prohibits selecting such a
measure for expressions like more1 coffee.
(13) a. volume(x)< volume(y)
b. weight(x)< weight(y)
c. temperature(x) 6< temperature(y)
d. etc.
This account, then, presents a clean picture of the facts that we have so far
considered. Nonetheless, there are reasons to seek an alternative.
2.3 Reasons to seek an alternative
Cardinality meets Schwarzschild’s condition, since the count of elements in a plu-
rality will be greater than that of any of its proper subpluralities. However, the
putative MANY that invokes cardinality isn’t subject to that condition; its only role
is to regulate the selection of measure functions with MUCH. On this picture, the
apparent adherence to S-monotonicity in sentences like (1b) is accidental. If there
7 See also Nakanishi 2007; Wellwood et al. 2012; cp. Champollion 2010, 2017.
8 Note that the formulation I give in the text is more general than the original, which refers explicitly
to mereological structure. This choice reflects my assumption that any given noun or noun phrase
comes with a unique ordering on its domain, against which S-monotonicity is evaluated. This of
course places a heavy burden on the ontology; see Wellwood 2015 for some discussion.
9 I also assume that such sets are anti-atomic; see Gillon 2012 for recent discussion and references.
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language volume number difference
English much soup many cookies ‘lexical’
Spanish mucha sopa muchas galletas agreement
Italian molta minestra molti biscotti agreement
French beaucoup de soupe beaucoup de biscuits N morphology
Macedonian mnogu supa mnogu kolaci N morphology
Mandarin henduo tang henduo kuai quqi classifier
Bangla onek sup onek-gulo biskuT classifier
Table 2 Where many signals number with plural Ns in English, other languages
combine a univocal form with (broadly) plural marking. (See Wellwood
2014 for attributions of these data to native speaker consultants.)
are reasons to doubt the existence of primitive MANY, though, and furthermore to
suppose that comparatives always involve MUCH, then it must be that cardinality is a
required value for µ under certain conditions.
I see two reasons for doubting the existence of MANY. One is crosslinguistic,
while the second is more theory-internal.
First, surveying an array of languages, there is no supporting evidence for the
suggestion that there are two distinct primitives in the relevant semantic field. That
is, the English distinction between much and many does not recur: instead, the
shift from consideration of (e.g.) volume to number is reflexive on the presence
of (broadly) plural marking, with no change in the form of the expression that
introduces the measure; see Table 2. Spanish transparently illustrates the general
pattern: speaking of Juan, we can say that he drank a lot of beer (by volume) using
the form in (14a), or that he drank a lot of beers (by number) using (14b).
(14) Spanish: Univocal form, unequivocal semantics
a. mucha cerveza volume
b. muchas cervezas number
Second, if only S-monotonicity restricts the selection of values for µ , then the
account will overgenerate: so far, it can’t guarantee comparisons by number for
more1 where they’re observed. This is reportedly the case for comparatives with
superordinate mass nouns like furniture (see Bale & Barner 2009 for discussion
and references),10 (15a). The comparison by number is restricted to contexts with
10 Barner & Snedeker (2005) report experimental data supporting this: presented with pictures of small
sets of furniture and asked which is “more”, both adults and children strongly preferred to answer






Figure 1 Hypothetical extension for furniture in a context. Nodes represent pieces
of furniture and pluralities thereof, lines represent plural-part relations.
the bare noun, compare (15a) and (15b); indeed, the comparatives with as here
obligatorily involve much, (16).
(15) a. Ann bought more furniture than Bill did. cardinality, *weight, ...
b. * Ann bought more furnitures than Bill did. ??
(16) a. Ann bought as much furniture as Bill did. cardinality, *weight, ...
b. * Ann bought as many furniture(s) as Bill did.
Here’s the issue. Let the extension of furniture be as in Figure 1; it is a join
semi-lattice with atomic minimal parts a, b, and c (e.g., a table, chair, ...). Formally,
this extension shares many of the formal properties typically assumed for plural
nouns. Whichever plurality of pieces xx, yy we pick such that xx≺ yy, it will be true
that weight(xx)< weight(yy). Given that this is so, and given that we are armed so
far only with S-monotonicity, we should expect that (15a) could be interpreted as a
comparison of weights, contrary to fact. I call this ‘the weight problem’.
The crosslinguistic picture suggests a lack of support for primitive MANY from
the perspective of morphology. The weight problem suggests a lack of support for
semantic obligation, however. These authors presented adults with text-based descriptions of two
sets of (e.g.) pieces of furniture, and found a substantial proportion of non-number-based responses.
For example, their Experiment 4 varied whether the furniture’s utility was relevant, before asking
the comparative question. When use was not relevant, judgments indeed tracked the number of
pieces (75% number-based). When use was relevant, however, the ‘heterogeneity’ of the two sets
better predicted participants’ judgments (65% heterogeneity-based). In ongoing work in my lab, we
systematically varied the number, size, and heterogeneity (operationalized in a couple of different
ways) of two sets of furniture in pictures, and have found that both adults and children strongly
preferred to judge based on number (adults 92% number-based; children, 72.1% number-based). We
will see if we can reproduce Grimm & Levin’s effect using contextual manipulations. If we can, this
could support their analysis in which furniture-type nouns introduce both individuals and events into
the semantics. Given the availability of a different ‘thing’ to measure, it should be possible to render
such an account consistent with the ontology-dependent theory I advance here.
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such a primitive from the perspective of semantics, as well, at least if MUCH can be
restricted to cardinality measures for nouns like furniture and coffees.
3 Univocality + S-monotonicity + A-invariance
The Univocality account aims to eliminate the need for a primitive MANY by con-
straining the semantics of MUCH. On this account, more univocally realizes MUCH-
ER, and the value σ(µ) introduced by MUCH is constrained by S-monotonicity
as well as by a constraint that I will call A(utomorphism)-invariance. Where S-
monotonicity ensures that non-trivial ordering relations are preserved in the mapping
to degrees, A-invariance ensures that the mapping is invariant with respect to any
strongly structure-preserving permutation on the measured domain.
I first point to the required morphophonological component of any univocal
account—an analysis in which many is an allomorph of MUCH (cf. Spanish (14)). I
focus, however, on developing a semantics for MUCH that can restrict comparatives
involving coffees, ideas, and furniture to just comparisons by number.
3.1 Morphosyntax
Recall the data in (6) and (7): only much can surface with bare nouns, while only
many can surface with plural nouns (e.g., *as many coffee, *as much coffees). The
Univocality account will suppose that this is a surface difference arising from the
morphophonological component of grammar. I thus assume, for now, the existence
of any sufficient such rule that will produce many where it occurs—that is, in the
environment of the nominal plural, e.g. (17).
(17) MUCH →morph many / PL
Of course, any serious proposal of this type will have to specify in greater detail
the appropriate syntactic scope and limits of the relevant rule; we will want to
generate as many tall books, for example, but not *as much tall books, etc. I do not
attempt to do this here; the reader may see Dunbar & Wellwood’s (2016) updated
fragment of Bresnan’s 1973 morphosyntax, for a place to begin thinking about this.
3.2 Semantics
If more uniquely realizes MUCH-ER, then just one semantic analysis is needed: the
semantics must guarantee that σ(µ) is valued by a cardinality function whenever
MUCH targets nouns like coffees and furniture.
As discussed extensively by Bale & Barner (2009), the critical connection
between these types of nouns is that their domains consist of pluralities composed
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of individuals, the entities we typically refer to as ‘atoms’ (thus, both nouns have
domains with the structure of atomic join semi-lattices). Bale & Barner’s accounting
of the Number generalization capitalizes on this formal similarity, but the restriction
that they impose on (non-decomposed) more is, so far, essentially arbitrary.11
(18) a. I bought more coffees. cardinality, *weight
b. I bought more furniture. cardinality, *weight
We want a principled account in which the constraint on the selection of mea-
sure functions accords with the following intuition: domains DP that can only be
measured by cardinality can only be so measured because only cardinality uniquely
characterizes—or represents—DP. To make the intuition clear, consider that car-
dinality assigns all of the singletons in a plural domain DP (assuming an inclusive
theory of plurality) to the number 1, pluralities consisting of two atoms to the number
2, etc. In contrast, weight can assign different values to any of these, such that a
given singleton could weigh the same as a doubleton, etc.
To eliminate the weight problem, then, I propose that the selection of val-
ues for σ(µ) is constrained not only by S-monotonicity but by A(utomorphism)-
Invariance.12 A-invariance says that permissible µs assign the same value to any
x ∈ DP as to h(x) ∈ DP, where h is a strongly structure-preserving permutation of
DP, as defined directly.
A-invariance
∀x ∈ DP, ∀h ∈ Aut(〈DP,-P〉), µ(x) = µ(h(x))
More formally, I assume that an automorphism h is any bijective function that
maps a set, here DP, to itself, in accord with (19): any ordering relations holding
between x and y in DP must hold between h(x) and h(y). Since any automorphism
h on DP is invertible (bijectivity), and its domain is (exactly) the same as its range
(endomorphy), (19) cannot be satisfied by a function that preserves only trivial
ordering relations between elements of DP (order preservation).
(19) ∀x,y ∈ DP, x-P y iff h(x)-P h(y)
Some quick examples should make this clear. Suppose here and below that
DP = {a,b,c,ab,ac,bc,abc} (the inclusive set of pluralities whose minimal parts
11 The account goes roughly like this: resolving the variable dimensionality evinced by more involves
an orderly selection from a list of measure functions; and, cardinality holds a privileged position in
this list; if the comparison targets entities in an atomic semi-lattice, there is a requirement that the
selection stop at this position.
12 I consider the question, below, whether both constraints are needed, or whether A-invariance could
be sufficient for capturing our two generalizations. My tentative conclusion, there, is negative.
88
Structure preservation
are the individuals a, b, and c), and the ordering -P on this set has all of the
properties that we think the domains of plural nouns like toys or superordinate mass
nouns like furniture have (i.e., they are atomic join semi-lattices).
Now then, h in (20) is an example of an automorphism on DP.
(20) Automorphism h in Aut(〈DP,-P〉)
a. h = [a 7→ b, b 7→ c, c 7→ a, ab 7→ bc, ac 7→ ab, bc 7→ ac, bc 7→ abc]
b. range(h) = domain(h) [endomorphy]
c. there is a function g such that domain(g) = range(h) [bijectivity]
d.¬∃x,y[x-P y ∧ h(x) 6-P h(y)] [order preservation]
There are many functions h that are not automorphisms on DP; (21) gives some
examples, along with reasons for their failure.
(21) Functions h not in Aut(〈DP,-P〉)
a. Any h = [a 7→ d, . . . ], since d 6∈ DP [not endomorphic]
b. Any h = [a 7→ b,c 7→ b, . . . ], since not invertible [not bijective]
c. Any h = [a 7→ c,ab 7→ a, . . . ], since a-P ab, but h(a) 6-P h(ab)
[not order-preserving]
3.3 No more weight problem
Since any automorphism h on atomic 〈DP,%P〉 pairs singletons with singletons,
doubletons with doubletons, etc., then any xx ∈ DP is such that cardinality(xx) =
cardinality(h(xx)), whatever else can be said about DP. Therefore, measures by
cardinality are A-invariant with respect to such a domain.
However, measures by weight are not; a counter-example is given in (22).
(22) Let DP = {b,c,bc}, h an automorphism on DP such that h(b) = c, and
weight : [b 7→ 120lbs,c 7→ 240lbs, . . .]. Then, since
a. weight(h(b)) = weight(c),
b. weight(h(b)) = 240lbs; so,
c. weight(h(b)) 6= weight(b), because
d. 120lbs 6= 240lbs.
Thus, an account that constrains the selection of measure functions for MUCH
by A-invariance seems promising: it permits cardinality but excludes (at least in
the general case) weight. Such an account also raises new questions. For example,
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(i) will A-invariance apply correctly outside of relevantly plural domains? And,
(ii) should we understand A-invariance to supplement S-monotonicity, or could it
replace that condition?
For now, my answers to these questions are tentative. Towards (i), I say ‘yes’. If
A-invariance applies whenever a measure function is considered as a value for µ , then
it must permit volume and weight with more coffee but exclude temperature, etc.
And I think it does this. Suppose that the extension of coffee is a dense ordering of
portions of coffee by inclusion. Any automorphism (hence, any h ∈ Aut(〈DC,%C〉))
will preserve this structure exactly. Indeed, it seems that just in the same way that
cardinality can be said to represent essential structure of plural part-of relations,
volume or weight do the same for material part-of relations.
Towards (ii), I suggest that the answer is ‘no’. There are conceivable measure
functions (i.e., functions that map individuals or events to degrees) that will fail to
strongly preserve the structure of the domain for measurement, but which would sat-
isfy A-invariance. Consider a hypothetical such function, one, that maps everything
to the number 1. This function trivially satisfies A-invariance, since any x ∈ DP will
be such that one(x) = 1, and of course one(h(x)) = 1, etc. Such a function will not
satisfy S-monotonicity, however, since for any x,y ∈ DP such that x≺P y, it is not
the case that one(x)< one(y).
If these answers are on the right track, then we have successfully subsumed
our two generalizations to just one—Monotonicity. The difference between the
sentences in (1) reflects the differing outcomes of calculating S-monotonicity and
A-invariance against domains with different formal properties.
3.4 Compositional sketch
For completeness, this section briefly sketches a compositional implementation of
the semantics. I demonstrate this for (1a) and (1b), repeated as in (23a) and (23b).
(23) a. Ann bought more coffee than Bill did.
b. Ann bought more coffees than Bill did.
The lexical axiom for MUCH can be seen as the same on the two accounts that
we have considered; in (24a), α indicates neutrality between portions, individuals,
pluralities, events, etc. Correspondingly, -ER is interpreted as in (24b), where δ is the
degree provided by a than-clause, when present. Combining these two by Functional
Application as in (25), the result is a property of entities α , the σ(µ)-measure of
which is greater than δ .
(24) a. JMUCHµKσ = λα.σ(µ)(α)
b. JERKσ (δ ) = λg.λα.g(α)> δ
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language base N singular N
Russian lyod ‘ice’ l’dina ‘block of ice’
Breton geot ‘grass’ geot-enn ‘blade of grass’
Classical Arabic teen ‘mud’ teenah ‘a chunk of mud’
Fox owiiyaasi ‘meat’ owiiyaasa ‘a piece/cut of meat’
Table 3 Singulatives. (Based on Mathieu 2012 and references therein.)
language base N singular N plural N
Hebrew se’ar ‘hair’ sa’ar-a sa’ar-ot
Breton buzhug ‘worms’ buzhug-enn buzhug-enn-oú
Fox14 zhooniyaahi ‘silver, money’ zhooniyaaha zhooniyaaha-ki
Ojibwe15 mikwam ‘ice’ mkwamiins mkwamiins-ag
Table 4 Pluralized singulatives. (Based on Mathieu 2012 and references therein.)
(25) JERKσ (δ )(JMUCHµKσ ) = λα.σ(µ)(α)> δ FA
(23a) and (23b) obviously overlap in their head noun, coffee, but they are evalu-
ated along different dimensions. The way that MUCH works is that ‘what is measured’
and ‘how it’s structured’ play an important role in calculating that dimensionality. I
encode the overlap and difference, then, between coffee and coffees as a mapping
between different (sub-)domains: bare coffee introduces a property of portions of
coffee, while coffees introduces a property of pluralities, each atomic part of which
is constituted by some coffee. On this view, pluralizing a noun like coffee involves
mapping an anti-atomic domain to an atomic one.
A covert morpheme SG can be used to bridge the substance and plurality domains
following, for example, Mathieu’s (2012) work on singulatives. Such a morpheme is
overt in other languages (see Table 3), and surfaces when substance-denoting nouns
are pluralized (see Table 4). In other words, the derivation of coffees in English
parallels Mathieu’s analysis of Ojibwe ‘icicles’ (Figure 2). Semantically, we can
assign SG the role of introducing a map from a property of substance to a property
of atomic entities constituted by some of that substance.13
More formally, let’s suppose that COFFEE introduces a property of portions of
13 A more theory-internal reason for taking this circuitous route—mapping a substance property to an
atomic property to a plural property—is that it wouldn’t do to map coffee simply to a property of
atoms, to the exclusion of pluralities; such properties are not measurable (see Hackl 2001; Nakanishi
2007; Wellwood et al. 2012, etc). And indeed, according to Mathieu (p.c.), singulative-marked NPs
in the relevant languages will not be available to comparative quantification, while those bearing


























Figure 2 A parallel derivation for Ojibwe mikwamiinsag (‘icicles’, top; Mathieu
2012), and English coffees (bottom).
coffee c, (26a). SG maps such a property to a property of atomic entities that are
materially constituted by some c, (26b).16 Issues of context-dependent atomicity are
likely to be relevant here (see, e.g., Sutton & Filip 2016 for recent discussion and
references), so let us suppose that the context provides some salient individuation
criteria—i.e., a value for a C variable on atom in (26b). The semantics of PL, in
turn, presupposes an individuated property, f in (26c), and maps f to a property of
pluralities xx, every atomic part of which satisfies f .17
(26) a. JCOFFEEKσ = λx.coffee(x)
b. JSGKσ = λ f : anti-atomic( f ).λy : atomC(y).∃x[ f (x) & yBm x]
c. JPLKσ = λ f : atomic( f ).λxx.∀x[xx(x)→ f (x)]
Thus, the semantic effect of combining COFFEE and SG is as in (27a), and
combining that result with PL is as in (27b).
(27) a. JSGKσ (JCOFFEEKσ )
= λy : atom(y).∃x[coffee(x) & yBm x]
b. JPLKσ (JSGKσ (JCOFFEEKσ )) [abb. as coffees below]
= λxx.∀y : atom(y)[xx(y)→∃x[coffee(x) & yBm x]]
As desired, combining these NPs with more means that constraints on the
selection of σ(µ) will be calculated relative to its application to different things: it
16 See Parsons 1979 and Link 1983, for example.
17 In (26c) and below, I write xx(x) to remain neutral between a variety of options, depending on one’s
theory of the representation of plural properties. For example, it could mean x ∈ xx if xx ranges
over sets, among(x,xx) if xx is a plural variable, or x< xx if pluralities are sums, etc. For different
approaches, see for example Link 1983; Boolos 1984; Winter 2001.
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will be relativized to a partial ordering on portions of coffee in (28a), and to a partial
ordering on pluralities in (28b).
(28) a. Jmoreµ coffeeKσ = λx.coffee(x) & σ(µ)(x)> δ PM
b. Jmoreµ coffeesKσ = λxx.coffees(xx) & σ(µ)(xx)> δ PM
I interpret the sentences in (1a)/(23a) and (1b)/(23b) as in (29a) and (29b),
respectively. Each expresses an existential statement about buying events by Ann,
and differ just in what is said about their themes: it is some portion of coffee
measuring greater than any corresponding portion for Bill, (29a), or some plurality
of coffees measuring greater than any corresponding plurality for Bill.18
(29) a. ∃e[ag(e,a) & buying(e) & ∃x[th(e,x) & coffee(x) & σ(µ)(x)> δ ]], where δ =
max(λd.∃e[ag(e,b) & drinking(e) & ∃x[coffee(x) & th(e,x) & σ(µ)(x)≥ d]])
b. ∃e[ag(e,a) & buying(e) & ∃xx[th(e,xx) & coffees(xx) & σ(µ)(xx)> δ ′]], where δ ′ =
max(λd.∃e[ag(e,b) & drinking(e) & ∃xx[coffees(xx) & th(e,xx) & σ(µ)(xx)≥ d]])
4 Beyond truth conditions
So far, I have provided conceptual, empirical, and theoretical reasons to support a
univocal account of the structure and meaning of comparatives with more. Now, I
briefly recall a small set of experimental results that suggest the same conclusion. I
understand these results to relate coherently and straightforwardly to the representa-
tional theory offered under a Univocality account, whereas they do not hang together
quite so well on an Ambiguity account.
For example, all else equal Univocality expects the acquisition trajectories of
much and many in English to intertwine, but Ambiguity doesn’t. And in particular,
if many is derived from MUCH by rule as I have suggested, then we might expect
that relation to involve overgeneralizing the form much, rather than the other way
around. This is in fact the pattern that Gathercole 1985 observes: children up to 7
years 6 months overextended much with plural nouns, but they never used many
with bare nouns. This pattern is reminiscent of other error patterns familiar from
morphological acquisition, and unsurprising if Univocality is right.
Moreover, Univocality expects simultaneous acquisition of more with bare and
plural occurrences (again, all else equal). And so far, the evidence is consistent
with this sort of ‘all or nothing’ acquisition. Children appear to acquire more with
its sensitivity to measurement of substances versus pluralities at the same time, as
revealed by studies examining how that understanding develops (Odic et al. 2013).
18 For space reasons, I can’t provide the full derivational details. Similar compositional assumptions are
worked out in detail in Wellwood 2014, though.
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Part of this, of course, is an adult-like sensitivity to how grammatical context can shift
the dimension for N, regardless of what one otherwise prefers to think about when
given more N: given an ‘ambiguous’ world supporting both volume and number
quantification, children chose volume when asked about “more fem”, but number
when asked about “more fems” (Barner & Snedeker 2006).
For a last point, consider two facts that a semantics for comparatives might want
to address: (i) children’s earliest evaluation of plural nominal comparatives uses
their Approximate Number System, or ANS (Dehaene 1997, Feigenson, Dehaene &
Spelke 2004, Halberda & Feigenson 2008), and their ability to recruit this system to
answer a “more” question is independent of their understanding of natural number
(Halberda, Taing & Lidz 2008); (ii) adults, too, use their ANS to answer “more”
questions, at least under speeded conditions (cf. Pietroski, Lidz, Hunter & Halberda
2009, Lidz, Halberda, Pietroski & Hunter 2011, cp. Kotek, Sudo & Hackl 2015).19
Supposing Ambiguity, recruiting the ANS in the evaluation of a plural nominal
comparative as in (i) and (ii) above would have to be explained away as reflecting
some kind of partial or imperfect knowledge about what such sentences mean.20
In contrast, so long as the ANS ‘scale’ meets the conditions I’ve laid out for the
selection of measure functions given relevantly plural domains (i.e., so long as it is
S-monotonic and A-invariant here), a measure function like approximate number
would in fact be grammatically licensed.
Does this point go in favor of Univocality, then? I can offer a couple of thoughts.
ANS representations have a richer structure than exact number representations,
but they might not be relevantly different enough such that ANS representations
could fail to meet our conditions; Gallistel & Gelman (1992) argue at length that
the systems are in fact isomorphic. On the face of it, then, finding a relevant
counterexample should be difficult. Meanwhile, this question invites consideration
of what we might want to say about languages with a near translational equivalent of
more, but limited access to exact number (cf. Pica, Lemer, Izard & Dehaene 2004).
The two accounts thus plausibly differ in how they would characterize successful
grasp of the meaning of comparative sentences. They definitely differ in the aptness
of their predictions as to how the acquisition of that meaning should proceed, and as
to how it should come packaged across languages. All else being equal, a semantic
theory with a better shot at predicting relevant facts in neighboring domains should
be preferred over its alternatives.
19 Some of these results involve evaluating most sentences. most shows the same variability and
constraints as more, and some recent analyses analyze the superlative as constructed out of the
comparative (e.g. Stateva 2003, Bobaljik 2012, Szabolcsi 2012, Dunbar & Wellwood 2016).
20 That is, so long as one doesn’t modify the Ambiguity account so that MANY contains a variable over
relevantly number-like measure functions. I don’t know that anyone would seriously entertain such




I argued that more uniquely decomposes into MUCH and -ER. I suggested a semantics
for MUCH designed to capture central facts about how sentences with more are
understood: the dimension for comparison in any given comparative can vary, but
only within the limits prescribed by coupling strong structure preservation with
differences in the measured domain.
By emphasizing structure preservation as critical to this understanding, the
account invites measurement-theoretic notions into the functional vocabulary. Mea-
surement is generally understood as involving a structure-preserving map between
an observed or observable relation between entities, and mathematical structures
that represent the quantitative differences inherent in those relations (e.g. Berka
1983). Meanwhile, the mass/count literature tends to suppose that expressions like
coffee and coffees apply to entities with different properties, albeit similar relational
structures. If my theory is correct, then the differences in dimensionality observed
with these expressions is a consequence of those differences.
Measurement-theoretic notions have been invoked in semantic theory before.
Recently, Sassoon 2010 uses the formal typology of scales from measurement theory
(e.g., ordinal, ratio, interval, etc.) to categorize the scales associated with gradable
adjectives and scalar modifiers. Lassiter 2011 does similar in his analysis of modal
auxiliaries and attitude verbs like want. I see my project as complementary. For one
thing, the comparatives proper seem importantly different from degree modifiers;
see Fults 2006. For another, my account invokes the concept of measurement, rather
than selections from a typology of its instances.
A push for univocality in one empirical corner invites the question of how much
further it should be pushed. In general, Ambiguity-inclined theorists appear to be
okay with the assumption that the more occurring with coffee is different from that
occurring with intelligent: more introduces measure functions in the former case, but
intelligent does so in the latter. Comparing these nominal and adjectival instances,
though, it seems that here too the evidence for ambiguity might be found wanting
(see Wellwood 2012, 2014, forthcoming, Dunbar & Wellwood 2016, Cariani et al.
2018; submitted for attempts to extend Univocality in this direction).
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